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PLAYING THE SLOTS: THE FAA GAMBLES WITH ITS
CONTROVERSIAL CONGESTION MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR NEW YORK'S BUSIEST AIRPORTS
BENJAMIN D. WILLIAMS*
"Whenever competition is feasible, it is, for all its imperfections, supe-
rior to regulation as a means of serving the public interest."
-Alfred E. Kahn, Airline economist, former chairperson of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the architect of airline
deregulation
I. INTRODUCTION
N 2007, air traffic control (ATC) delays and airspace conges-
tion climbed to near-historic levels in the United States.
Scores of aircraft clogged the nation's airways-even on good-
weather days-and the flying public endured unprecedented
delays and cancellations as a result. 2 In total, nearly two million
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.S., magna cum laude, Southern Methodist University. Before leaving to finish
law school, the author was a senior principal of labor relations for American
Airlines, Inc. The author is privileged to thank two of his most admired mentors,
Mrs. Jane G. Allen and Mrs. Sue M. Oliver, both of whom formerly held
leadership positions at American. Both are, in no small way, responsible for my
decision to take a leap of faith and enroll in law school. I remain forever
indebted to both Mrs. Allen and Mrs. Oliver for, among many other things,
imparting even a fraction of their collective wisdom and for bestowing upon me
their encouragement and selfless support. I have learned that, in life, we are
lucky to discover even one person who is willing to help embolden us in our
pursuits, to illuminate our paths, or to gently point us rightward. I am doubly
lucky because I have discovered not just one such mentor, but two.
See, e.g., Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International
Airport and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,544, 60,545
(Oct. 10, 2008) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93, sub pt. N) [hereinafter the JFK/
EWR Plan]; see also LIYA WANG ET AL., ANALYSIS OF AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR THE
NEW YORK METROPLEX: SUMMER 2007 1 (2008), http://catsr.ite.gmu.edu/pubs/
Wangetal_ICRAT v8.pdf.
2 See, e.g., the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,545 (providing background
information on ATC delays in New York); see also Operating Limitations at New-
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flights operated by large airlines experienced delays or cancella-
tion. 3 Delays became so pronounced, and the associated
onboard conditions so deplorable, some state legislatures at-
tempted to enact "passenger bills of rights" laws that would force
airlines to comply with certain safety and convenience require-
ments during protracted delays.4 Air traffic delays particularly
besieged the New York area, where the city's three busiest air-
ports-LaGuardia (LGA), John F. Kennedy International (JFK),
and Newark Liberty International (EWR) 5-became mired in
virtual gridlock.6' 7 These delays arose principally from airline
ark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,550, 29,550 (May 21, 2008)
[hereinafter the EWR Limit Rule] (noting that delays at some airports occur
"even under ideal weather conditions"). When weather conditions are unfavora-
ble, the delays only worsen. Id.
3 Airline Delays and Consumer Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, I 10th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing
on Aviation Delays] (statement of the Honorable D.J. Gribbin, General Counsel,
Department of Transportation), available at http://transportation.house.gov/Me-
dia/File/Aviation/20080409/DJ%2OGribbin.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir.
2008). In the wake of unprecedented delays at New York City's major airports in
particular-delays which caused some passengers to endure abominably harsh
conditions onboard stranded aircraft (including going without food and water
for several hours)-the legislature of New York enacted a passenger bill of rights
designed to limit the most egregious effects of protracted airline delays. See id.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, however, that federal law preempted
the legislation. Id. at 223.
5 For ease of reference, the three major New York airports are referred to
herein by their respective International Air Transport Association (IATA) airport
codes: LaGuardia as "LGA"; Kennedy as 'JFK"; and Newark as "EWR."
6 See the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) "Fight Gridlock Now" web-
site, http://www.fightgridlocknow.gov/aviation/aviation.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2009); see also, Scott McCartney, Frequent Flying: SmallJets, More Trips Worsen Airport
Delays-FAA Likes Bigger Craft But Passengers, Airlines Prefer Busy Schedules, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 13, 2007, at Al (noting that "the nation's air-travel system approached
gridlock" in the summer of 2007).
7 The airspace congestion phenomenon extends beyond New York and even
the United States. In a recent publication, the IATA, a global aviation trade or-
ganization, remarked:
Due to an imbalance between the demand for worldwide air trans-
port and the availability of adequate airport facilities/infrastructure
and airspace systems to meet such demand, the number of con-
gested airports worldwide is growing. As a result, the airline indus-
try is increasingly subjected to serious operational disruptions, with
a significant number of delayed departures and arrivals, which re-
sult in significant economic penalties.
INT'L AIR TRANSP. Ass'N, WORLDWIDE SCHEDULING GUIDELINES, at v (17th ed.
2008), http://-wv.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/2C1BAA18-6297-4984-A74E-4A6D 1F
945A55/0/WSG16thEdition.pdf.
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over-scheduling. 8 When airline demand for certain airports ex-
ceeds the capacity limitations of those airports, logjam and de-
lays are inevitable.
In response to the air traffic congestion problem and the re-
sulting air traffic delays in the New York area, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) has devised a novel, yet controversial,
congestion management plan. The overall scheme combines re-
strictions on the number of takeoffs and landings (i.e., "slots")
at the three New York airports with an inventive, market-based
method for allocating those slots among airline carriers.9 A
"slot" is "the operational authority to conduct one IFR 1° landing
or takeoff operation each day during a specific hour or thirty
minute period at one of the High Density Traffic Airports." 11 A
slot is a kind of reservation: carriers reserve a takeoff or landing
at a particular airport at a particular time. To cope with the
swell of increased aircraft operations in New York, and to better
align those operations with airspace capacity limitations, the
FAA routinely limits (or "caps") the number of available slots at
New York airports. 12 By limiting the number of slots, the FAA
eases congestion and reduces delays. Slot caps thus balance
(seemingly unbridled) airline demand for airport access with
the airports' respective capacity limitations.
8 Airline over-scheduling occurs when scheduled flights exceed airport and
airspace capacity. See WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
9 See generally the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1 at 60,544; see also Congestion
Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,574, 60,576-77 (Oct.
10, 2008) [hereinafter the LGA Plan] (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93, sub. pt. C).
The FAA delineates its congestion management plans for the three New York
airports in two separate rules: one rule, 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.161-73 (2008), addresses
congestion management at both JFK and EWR. The second, 14 C.F.R.
§§ 93.35-47 (2008), addresses congestion at LGA. The two rules are similar and
employ the same basic market-based methodologies for congestion reduction.
The LGA plan, unlike the JFK/EWR plan, however, involves a reduction in the
current number of available slots. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
10 IFR stands for Instrument Flight Rules. 14 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2008).
11 14 C.F.R. § 93.213(a) (2) (2008). EWR, JFK, and LGA are "high density traf-
fic airports" for purposes of the "slot" definition. 14 C.F.R. § 93.123 (2008); see
also the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,546 (defining a slot for purposes of
the FAA's congestion management plan as "the right to land or depart during a
30-minute window").
12 See, e.g., the EWR Limit Rule, supra note 2, at 29,554 (ordering a cap of
eighty-one slots per hour at EWR); Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia
Airport; Notice of Order, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,854 (Dec. 27, 2006) (ordering a cap of
seventy-five slots per hour at LGA). The FAA also caps slots at other high-density
airports like Washington Reagan Airport and Chicago O'Hare.
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Capping slots alone, however, yields an undesirable effect.
The caps impose artificial limits on the number of flights into or
out of an airport, which in turn discourages competition among
the airlines already serving the capped airport. 3 Incumbent
carriers (i.e., those airlines currently possessing slots at a particu-
lar airport) monopolize the existing slots and thus preclude
non-incumbent carriers (i.e., those carriers that do not currently
operate at an airport, but that might wish to do so; also called,
"new entrant" carriers) from entering the market.14 Therefore,
to promote a competitive environment powered by market
forces, and in order to afford opportunity to potential new en-
trant carriers, the FAA's congestion management plan (in addi-
tion to capping the total number of slots at the three airports)
also calls for some incumbent carriers to relinquish a handful of
their slots so that the FAA can auction them to the highest bid-
der."5 The successful bidders then hold their slots as leases with
defined expiration terms. After the leases expire, the slots are
again put up for auction. 16 The FAA designed this innovative
plan with the following tripartite aim: to "[1] create a more effi-
cient allocation of slots, [2] provide opportunities for new entry,
and [3] reduce congestion."'17
Announcement of the slot auction plan unleashed a torrent
of staunch opposition from several airlines, the Port Authority
of New York, and the Air Transport Association of America
(ATA), 18 a trade organization that represents the nation's air
carriers. An initial administrative protest from the carriers and
the ATA was adjudicated before the FAA's Office of Dispute Res-
13 Hearing on Aviation Delays, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that "[s]traight caps
without some mechanism to ensure an efficient allocation of scarce slot resources
is not economically efficient and, therefore, not [a] preferred option").
"4 See generally Eileen M. Gleimer, Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How
Did We Get Here and Where Are We Going?, 61J. AIR L. & COM. 877, 907-08 (1996)
(discussing the economic disincentives among carriers to release valuable slots to
their competitors).
15 See the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,546-47; the LGA Plan, supra note
9, at 60,574; see also Press Release, FAA, Slot Auction (Dec. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/news-story.cfm?newsId=10346.
16 See the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,547; the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at
60,577.
17 FAA, 2009 NEW YORK SLOT AUCTIONS BIDDER SEMINAR 4 (Dec. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter Bidder Seminar], http://www.faa.gov/about/officeorg/head
quarters-offices/aep/nyauctions/ (follow the "2009 New York Slot Auction Bid-
der Seminar Presentation" hyperlink).
18 Air Transport Association, http://v.airlines.org/aboutata/ (last visited
June 10, 2009).
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olution for Acquisition (ODRA), a dispute resolution agency
charged with resolving acquisition-related disputes between the
FAA and those bidding for FAA contracts. 19 The plan also
spooked Congress, inducing it to seek an opinion from the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) on the legality of the auc-
tions. 20 On October 14, 2008, the ATA (later joined by several
airlines and other entities) filed suit against the FAA seeking a
declaration that the FAA's slot auction plans be found illegal
because, among other reasons, they impermissibly exceed the
FAA's statutory authority.2 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
recently stayed the FAA's plan pending final judgment in the
case.
22
In light of these events, this comment will endeavor to illumi-
nate the current airspace congestion dilemma in effort to con-
textualize the backdrop against which the slot auction plan is
cast. Further, the comment will unravel the intricacies of the
FAA's auction plan and will expound upon the brewing contro-
versy between government agencies on the one hand, and the
private transportation sector on the other. Finally, the com-
ment will examine and evaluate the efficacy of the legal argu-
ments on both sides of the slot-auction debate, centering
principally on this enigmatic question: does the FAA possess the
legal authority to implement its market-based slot allocation
plan as a means to control airspace congestion?
19 See generally In re Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc., Docket No. 08-ODRA-00452
(and series) (Sept. 30, 2008) (finding that the FAA is within its legal authority to
conduct slot auctions).
20 See generally Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov't Ac-
countability Office, to James L. Oberstar, et al., Chairman, Comm. on Transp. &
Infrastructure (Sept. 30, 2008) [hereinafter the GAO Opinion], http://
www.gao.gov/decisions/other/316796.pdf; see also Letter from Forty-Eight Con-
gresspersons to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Oct. 31,
2008) (on file with author) (expressing "outrage at the [DOT's] decision to move
forward with a rule to conduct slot auctions .... ).
21 See Petition for Review, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, No. 08-1331
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2008) (LGA plan); Petition for Review, Air Transp. Ass'n of
Am., Inc. v. FAA, No. 08-1333 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2008) (JFK/EWR plan).
22 Order to Stay Case Pending Court Review, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v.
FAA, No. 08-1333 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2008) (on file with the author). In April
2009, the FAA filed a motion to hold the case in abeyance, which the court
granted. As of June 2009, the case remains in abeyance. See Order Granting
FAA's Motion to Hold Cases in Abeyance, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FAA,
No. 08-1262 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2009) (on file with author).
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II. THE GROWING AIR CONGESTION PROBLEM
IN NEW YORK
In 2007, approximately thirty percent of U.S. domestic flights
were either cancelled or delayed by more than fifteen minutes.23
Delays in the New York region were particularly grave: for LGA,
JFK, and EWR combined, flights were generally delayed more
often than the national average, and New York's flight cancella-
tion rate was the worst in the nation. 24 July of 2007 was particu-
larly hard hit: forty-three percent of the arrivals into JFK and
forty percent of the arrivals into LGA were late by more than
fifteen minutes.25 To worsen matters, delays in New York rever-
berate nationwide because of an air traffic "spillover effect."
Roughly one-third of the nation's commercial flights pass
through New York's airspace every day. 26 Thus, when delays
occur in the New York area, the "spillover effect" foments a cas-
cade of delays throughout the nation's entire airspace system. 27
Why is New York such a hotbed for air traffic delays? A 2007
study of New York air congestion coauthored by the Center for
Air Transportation and Systems Research and the NASA Langley
Research Center found that airline over-scheduling causes a sub-
23 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
24 Id. For the three airports combined, only 71.5% of the flights departed on
time, compared to a national average of 76.5%. Id. Only 62% of all New York
flights arrived on time, compared to a national average of over 73%. Id. The
flight cancellation rate for the New York area was 3.46%, compared to a national
cancellation rate of only 2.16%. Id.
25 W. Tom Whalen et al., Proposal for a Market-Based Solution to Airport Delays 4
(Econ. Analysis Group Discussion Paper, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pub-
lic/eag/227380.pdf. Mr. Whalen and his coauthors are economists with the
United States Department of Justice.
26 Hearing on Aviation Delays, supra note 3, at 2.
27 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. This is true principally because the nation's
airspace system is highly integrated. Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 1. Aircraft
transiting New York are of course scheduled to complete subsequent flights later
in the day. An aircraft departing LGA for Dallas first thing in the morning may
continue on to, for example, Los Angeles, then to Denver, then to Chicago (sub-
sequent destinations are commonly referred to in the industry as "down-line cit-
ies"). Depending on the airline and aircraft type, it is common for aircraft to fly
seven or more missions in a single day. Thus, when an aircraft transiting a New
York airport becomes delayed, that delay will necessarily impact travelers sched-
uled for the later down-line segments too. In the example above, if the LGA-to-
Dallas flight experiences a delay, down-line passengers such as those scheduled
on the later Denver-Chicago segment will also experience delays, absent some
intervening action by the carrier (like substituting a spare aircraft to cover the
down-line segments). New York congestion thus affects the whole of the nation's
airspace because of this spillover effect.
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stantial number of New York's delays. 28 That is, delays prolifer-
ate because airlines routinely schedule more air operations than
New York airport capacity can handle. 2' This practice is not un-
common. To be competitive in the popular New York market,
airlines have incentive to schedule a large number of flights to
and from the city. 30 Having many daily flights (or "frequen-
cies") between any two cities attracts consumers (particularly the
business traveler), who benefit from the conveniences provided
by a broad array of flight options. 1 If a business meeting runs
long (or finishes early), a business traveler can easily opt for a
later (or earlier) flight, so long as the particular airline offers
several flights a day in that market. Thus, high demand in any
market, coupled with competition on the route among two or
more carriers, creates impetus among airlines to schedule myr-
iad flights during peak times.3 2 By offering an attractive assort-
ment of options, the airlines can lure more travelers.3 3 To
manage costs and keep capacity in line with demand, however,
airlines schedule these flights on smaller aircraft. 4 As a result,
the number of individual flights increases, but without the ex-
pected concomitant increase in overall airline capacity.35 For
example, from 1997 to 2007, the number of departures in-
creased by thirty-five percent, but the total number of seats fly-
ing increased by only six percent.3 6
Assuming demand in any market is reasonably finite (at least
over the short run), in order for an airline to be able to offer
28 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
29 Id.
30 See generally John Sabel, Airline-Airport Facilities Agreements: An Overview, 69 J.
AIR L. & COM. 769, 779 (2004) (noting that in order to "generate a profit from
[their] revenues, [airlines] must schedule [their] flights so as to attract the great-
est number of passengers").
31 See McCartney, supra note 6, at Al.
32 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
33 See McCartney, supra note 6, at Al. A cursory examination of published air-
line schedules for key business markets provides evidence of this practice. For
example, in January, 2009, Southwest Airlines alone offered twenty-nine daily
weekday flights between Dallas and Houston, departing half-hourly. Southwest
Airlines, http://www.southwest.com (last visited June 10, 2009); American Air-
lines offered twenty-one daily weekday flights between Dallas (both DFW and
DAL) and Chicago. American Airlines, http://www.AA.com (last visitedJune 10,
2009). For the striking number of daily flights in a sampling of key New York
markets, see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
34 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2; see also McCartney, supra note 6, at Al.
35 See Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 4-5.
36 Id. This result inheres in part from the proliferation of small, regional jet
aircraft. Id. at 4.
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several frequencies so that it makes its schedule more attractive
to potential customers, it must deploy smaller aircraft in the
market. Otherwise, the airline will risk over-saturating the mar-
ket with too much capacity (a money-losing proposition). 7
When the small-aircraft, high-frequency phenomenon is aggre-
gated across several markets and several airlines, the result is in-
disputable: the inordinate number of aircraft competing for the
same airports and airspace clogs the nation's airspace arteries
and overwhelms airport capacity.3 8 The small-aircraft, high-fre-
quency business model may be attractive to consumers of air
travel, but it also creates the kind of unprecedented gridlock
New York experienced in 2007.19 In economic parlance, too
many aircraft are competing for too few runways, and the same
limited airspace. Thus, airport and airspace capacity becomes a
"scarce resource." 40
A simple hypothetical example illustrates this concept. Sup-
pose demand between city "X" and New York is roughly 1,000
travelers per day. Assuming that only one airline serves the mar-
ket, that airline can opt for a combination of aircraft type and
number of daily flights that will move 1,000 travelers per day in
that market. 4" For example, the airline might offer two flights a
day on 500-seat wide-body jets; five flights a day on mid-sized
200-seat jets; ten flights per day on 100-seat jets; twenty flights
per day on 50-seat regional jets; or any combination of flights
and seats that will closely match daily demand.42 The hypotheti-
cal airline, to attract the lion's share of passengers, will aim to
offer the widest selection of flights possible and will thus likely
opt for a higher-frequency, smaller-aircraft combination.43 In-
troducing competition in the market complicates matters.
When more than one carrier operates in the market, each car-
37 See, e.g., McCartney, supra note 6, at Al (noting the use of small aircraft in
high-frequency markets); see also Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 4-5.
38 McCartney, supra note 6, at Al; see also Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 4-5.
39 See Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 4-5.
40 Id. at 1.
41 Limited, of course, by the types of equipment the airline operates within its
fleet. For simplicity's sake, the hypothetical example assumes the carrier has
available to it a broad variety of aircraft fleet types.
42 All things being equal, the carrier would be discouraged from offering too
few seats, lest it forfeit revenue-generating opportunities by offering inadequate
supply to meet the demand. Similarly, the carrier is discouraged from offering
too much supply in the market, since excess cost results from the inefficiency of
flying empty seats. See generally Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 4-5.
43 Id. at 4, nn.6-7.
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rier tries to compete effectively by offering its own attractive ar-
ray of frequencies between city "X" and New York in the hope of
luring more passengers from the finite demand pool than its
competitor. 4 The airlines must balance the offering of a wide
selection of flights with the reality of flooding the market with
excess capacity, since empty seats are often the death knell for
airlines.45 The natural result, then, is that airlines deploy
smaller aircraft several times per day between New York and city
"X" rather than larger aircraft fewer times per day.46
When aggregated across several markets and several airlines,
the hypothetical illustration above bears itself out in the New
York area. In 2007, airlines served each of the top twenty mar-
kets from New York with over twenty flights per day per mar-
ket.47 For example, in the northeast corridor routes-a very
popular business market 48-airlines offered a combined sixty-
three daily flights between New York and Boston and forty-five
daily flights between New York and Washington D.C.'s Reagan
airport.4 9 That translates into approximately one flight every fif-
teen minutes between New York and Boston and one flight
every twenty minutes between New York and Washington D.C. 50
Airlines scheduled sixty daily flights from New York airports to
44 Id. at 4-5; see also WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. Fare sales, innovative
scheduling, and other factors may of course stimulate demand, thereby increas-
ing the size of the demand pool. For simplicity's sake, however, the hypothetical
example assumes a finite demand pool.
45 See TANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2 (noting that airlines use smaller aircraft so
that they can offer more frequencies in a market, thus maintaining "reasonable
costs" by matching supply with demand).
46 Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 4-5. Evidence of carriers behaving in this
manner can be seen by simply reviewing airline schedules. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text. For an elaboration on the smalljet airline-scheduling phe-
nomenon, see McCartney, supra note 6, at Al.
47 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
48 The northeast corridor includes routes between New York (especially LGA,
which is desirable because of its proximity to Manhattan) and both Boston Logan
airport and Washington Reagan airport. Both Delta Airlines and US Airways of-
fer "shuttle" service on these routes, with flights scheduled hourly in each market
in each direction. See Delta Airlines, http://www.delta.com/help/faqs/delta_
shuttle/ (last visited June 10, 2009); US Airways, http://www.usairways.com/
awa/content/traveltools/intheair/shuttleinfo.aspx (last visited June 10, 2009).
Other airlines, for example American Eagle (a subsidiary of AMR Corporation,
the parent company of American Airlines, Inc.) also serve the northeast corridor
markets. See, e.g., American Airlines, http://www.aa.com (last visited June 10,
2009).
49 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
50 Assuming a typical travel day encompasses a fifteen-hour period from 6 a.m.
to 9 p.m.
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Chicago's O'Hare and fifty-five daily flights from New York to
Atlanta.51 Airlines deploy relatively small-gauge aircraft in many
New York markets. For example, the average size aircraft used
for LGA flights is 75 seats;52 for JFK, the average size aircraft is
114 seats. 53 Combined, over one-third of the markets served
from LGA and EWR airports are flown with regional aircraft of
fifty seats or less.54 These smaller-sized jets, however, require
"the same access to the same scarce airport facilities and air traf-
fic network as do larger aircraft.
55
With airlines, encouraged to fly many frequencies using
smaller aircraft, the unsurprising result is saturation of the New
York airspace.56 In 2007, total "passenger trip delays 57 in-
creased nationwide by twenty-nine percent over 2006, costing
the economy $8.5 billion in lost productivity. 58 Among the five
airports with the highest number of passenger trip delays (that
is, the airports with the worst record for delays), JFK, LGA, and
EWR ranked first, third, and fourth respectively.59 Moreover, of
51 Id.
52 Seventy-five seats is roughly equivalent to a larger-end regional jet such as
the Canadair 700 or the Embraer E-170, both of which are commonly operated
by regional carriers in seventy-seat configurations. See, e.g., Embraer, http://
www.embraercommercialjets.com.br/english/content/ejets/emb170.asp (last
visited June 10, 2009). By contrast, a mid-sized jet like the Boeing 737 commonly
operates in passenger configurations with 120-140 seats. Boeing, http://www.
boeing.com/commercial/737family/pf/pflopas.html (last visited June 10,
2009).
53 WANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 6.
54 Id.
55 Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 5.
56 Interestingly, the FAA initially considered promulgating a rule that would
require "up-gauging" of aircraft for New York flights. See Congestion Manage-
ment Rule for LaGuardia Airport: Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,846, 20,847 (Apr. 17, 2008). "Up-gauging" is an industry
term that refers to using larger aircraft (i.e., larger-gauge aircraft) in place of
smaller-gauge aircraft. This results in fewer total flights, but without a decrease
in overall capacity. The reduction in flights eases congestion. Carriers re-
sponded unfavorably to the up-gauging proposal, however, and the FAA aban-
doned that plan in favor of the current auction scheme. Id. at 20,848-49.
57 "Passenger trip delay" is a delay "experienced by passengers at the time of
arrival at the gate at the intended destination airport. The delay is computed
relative to the scheduled arrival time published on the original airline ticket..."
and includes air travel disruptions resulting from delayed flights, cancelled
flights, rescheduling a passenger after she is denied boarding on an oversold
flight, and a delay resulting from an en route diversion. LANCE SHERRY & GEORGE
DONOHUE, U.S. AIRLINE PASSENGER TRIP DELAY REPORT (2007) 3 (2008), http://
catsr.ite.gmu.edu/pubs/AirlinePaxTripDelayReport2007.pdf.
58 Id. at 5.
59 Id. at 9-10.
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all U.S. airports, JFK and LGA experienced the largest increase
in trip delays year over year.6" Due to the spillover effect,6' New
York delays sparked further delays in "down-line '62 cities, and
the summer of 2007 "became the second worst on record na-
tionally for flight delays. 63
Congestion-related delays in the New York area became so
pronounced that the FAA designated both JFK and EWR air-
ports as IATA Level 3 Coordinated Airports.64 A "Level 3" desig-
nation means that air carriers must periodically submit to the
FAA their proposed schedules at the affected airport, and then
the FAA and the carriers work together to resolve whatever
scheduling concerns arise from the proposed schedules.65
Based on proposals from carriers seeking to increase their oper-
ations during peak hours, the FAA convened a meeting with the
carriers and subsequently issued an order capping JFK opera-
tions at eighty-one slots per hour.66 The FAA allocated those
slots according to agreements reached among the carriers at the
scheduling meeting.67 Concerned about rising congestion at
EWR, the FAA employed the same procedures for that airport;68
however, the carriers failed to reach the required slot-allocation
agreement.69
60 Id. (from 2006 to 2007). Passenger trip delays for both airports increased by
an average of over seven minutes. Id.
61 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
62 Id.
63 Bidder Seminar, supra note 17; see also the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at
60,545. Moreover, there is some speculation that the delays reported by the DOT
are understated. See Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 5-6. Airlines can (and do)
manipulate the delay statistics by artificially extending their arrival schedules so
that-even in the event an aircraft is delayed-it can still arrive within fifteen
minutes (the DOT cut-off period for mandatory delay reporting by airlines) of its
(artificially scheduled) arrival time. Id. at 5. For example, in 1998, flights be-
tween Dallas and LGA were scheduled at an average of 200 minutes (3:20) in
duration. Id. at 6. In 2007, however, the same flights were scheduled at an aver-
age of 211 minutes (3:31), a more than five percent increase in scheduled time.
Id. This artificial schedule padding increases the probability that the airline will
arrive "on time."
64 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,545. For a discussion on IATA classi-
fication codes and their effects, see INT'L AIR TIRNsP. ASS'N SCHEDULING GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 7, at 3.
65 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,545 n.3.
66 Id. at 60,545.
67 Id. Allocation by agreement is not uncommon and has been widely em-
ployed by the FAA in the past. See Gleimer, supra note 14, at 880-82.
68 Slot caps were already in effect at LGA airport. The LGA Plan, supra note 9,
at 60,575.
69 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,545-56.
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As public outrage over increased delays in the New York
area grew, President Bush ordered the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to commission a report outlining potential solutions.7 Sec-
retary Mary Peters thus authorized the formation of the New
York Aviation Rulemaking Committee (NYARC) "to help the
[DOT] and the FAA explore available options for congestion
management and [to determine] how changes to current policy
at all three ...airports would affect the airlines and the air-
ports. ''72 After considering the findings of the NYARC report73
and the comments offered in response to the FAA's proposed
congestion management plans, the FAA in October 2008 issued
proposed rules to create a long-term solution addressing New
York-area congestion."
III. THE FAA'S MARKET-BASED SOLUTION:
THE SLOT AUCTION PLAN
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FAA's APPROACH
TO CONGESTION MANAGEMENT
Using slots as a tool for managing airspace congestion is not
new. From 1969 to 2006, the FAA managed congestion at par-
ticular airports and during particular times of day according to
the "High Density Rule" (HDR). 75 The FAA allocated slots prin-
cipally based upon agreements struck among carriers at schedul-
ing meetings, which the carriers participated in pursuant to a
grant of antitrust immunity.7 6 After deregulation in 1978, air-
line operations proliferated and demand for access to high-den-
sity airports increased.77 By 1985, in an effort to accommodate
70 There are several articles reporting on the ill-effects of New York (and na-
tionwide) ATC delays. For a sampling, see Jeff Bailey & Nate Schweber, Ugly Air-
line Math: Planes Late, Fliers Even Later, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2007, at Al, McCartney,
supra note 6, at Al; Matthew L. Wald & Jeff Bailey, Push for Action on Flight Delays,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at Al.
71 See Wald & Bailey, supra note 70, at Al.
72 The LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,576.
73 The NYARC consisted of members from every major U.S. air carrier as well
as some foreign carriers, passenger groups, and the Port Authorities of New York
and New Jersey. See, e.g., the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,545.
74 Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International Airport
and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,626 (May 21, 2008).
This notice of proposed rulemaking ultimately became the final JFK/EWR Plan.
75 High Density Traffic Airports, 34 Fed. Reg. 2603 (Feb. 26, 1969); see also the
GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 3.
76 See, e.g., the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,574 (discussing the FAA's history
of congestion management and slot allocation).
77 The GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 4.
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the increased demand at those airports, the FAA created "more
permanent" slot-allocation procedures by using a "reverse lot-
tery" to withdraw up to five percent of slots from the carriers
holding them, thereby creating a pool of unused slots for new
entrant carriers to use.7 8 Those slots were reallocated by a sec-
ond lottery in which new entrant carriers or "limited incum-
bents"79 bid on the five percent of slots created by the reverse
lottery.80 As part of the total congestion management package
at HDR airports, the FAA also allowed those carriers holding
slots to sell or lease them to other carriers on a secondary mar-
ket.81 At the time, the FAA declined to use a slot auction proce-
dure to assign slots because it feared that "legislation would be
required for the collection and disposition of the proceeds
[from the auction] . ' 82 Apparently, the FAA's plan in 1986 to
withdraw slots from incumbents and reallocate them by lottery
was not opposed with litigation. 83
By 2000, growing Congressional concern that the HDR stifled
competition by unfairly favoring incumbent carriers 84 moti-
vated Congress to order a phase-out of the HDR at LGA and
JFK 8 5 The FAA remained concerned about New York-area air
traffic congestion, however, and continued to propose hourly
78 The LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,574 (citing High Density Traffic Airports;
Slot Allocation and Transfer Methods, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,195 (Dec. 20,
1985)). At the time, the FAA provided that "[s]lots do not represent a property
right but represent only an operating privilege subject to absolute FAA control."
High Density Traffic Airports; Slot Allocation and Transfer Methods, 50 Fed.
Reg. 52,180, 52,197 (Dec. 20, 1985) [hereinafter the HDR Slot Allocation Rule].
Thus, per the rule, the FAA could withdraw slots in its discretion.
79 Limited incumbents were those carriers that held less than eight slots at the
subject airport. Special Slot Withdrawal and Reallocation Procedures, 51 Fed.
Reg. 8632, 8632 (Mar. 12, 1986). The FAA did not allow those carriers with more
than eight slots to bid in the second lottery on the theory that simply reshuffling
slots between those carriers that already held a significant number would not
advance the intent of the reallocation plan: namely, to give new entrant carriers
access to the high-density airports, thereby promoting competition among several
carriers. Id.
80 Id.
81 See the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,574-75.
82 The HDR Slot Allocation Rule, supra note 78, at 52,183.
83 It is not likely that a challenge to the plan would have prevailed in any event,
given the holding in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir.
1981) just five years earlier. The Northwest Airlines case is treated in greater detail
herein. See discussion infra Part IV. B.
84 See, e.g., the GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 5d n.12 (citing H.R. REP. No.
103-240, at 29 (1993)).
85 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 41715-16 (2000 & Supp. IV 2005). There was no need to
address the HDR at EWR because the FAA had already suspended the slot pro-
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slot restrictions at LGA.86 While the FAA referred abstractly to
its desire to inaugurate a market-based approach to slot alloca-
tion, it ultimately concluded that it lacked the requisite Congres-
sional authority to do so. 8 7 When the FAA was unable to secure
express Congressional authority, and as the HDR phase-out be-
gan to create system overload in New York, the FAA issued tem-
porary slot capping orders for LGA, EWR, and JFK. 88 Although
these slot caps averted a complete airspace congestion emer-
gency, they were, by their terms, only a temporary solution.89
Slot caps alone, however, address only one side of the conges-
tion equation. While caps may provide relief at overtaxed air-
ports, they do not create a wholly satisfactory remedy because
caps advance anticompetitive practices and artificially drive up
airfares.9 ° Caps necessarily create a situation in which one car-
rier is allowed to use a scarce resource to the exclusion of all
others. To simply allocate slots according to historical carrier
operations at the three airports necessarily means that new en-
trant carriers are barred from entering the market (in any
meaningful way) unless an incumbent carrier independently de-
cides to relinquish slots. Thus, flight caps alone lock potential
competitors out of the New York market 91 and create perverse
incentives for incumbent carriers to hold slots just to prevent
gram at that airport in 1970. The GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 5 n.14 (citing
High Density Traffic Airports Rule, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,591, 16,593 (Oct. 24, 1970)).
86 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg.
51,360, 51,361 (Aug. 29, 2006). The FAA lifted the slot restrictions at JFK and
disaster resulted. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
87 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, supra note 86, at
51,362 (noting that, despite its desire to use a market-based approach to slot
allocations at LGA, "the FAA currently does not have the statutory authority to
assess market-clearing charges for a [slot]").
88 See The GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 6 n.18 (citing FAA's slot capping
orders in 71 Fed. Reg. 77,854 (Dec. 27, 2006) (LGA); 73 Fed. Reg. 3510 (Jan. 18,
2008) (JFK); 73 Fed. Reg. 14,552 (Mar. 18, 2008) (EWR)).
89 See, e.g., Order Limiting Scheduled Operations atJohn F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 3510, 3510 (Jan. 18, 2008) ("This Order establishes a
temporary limitation on the number of scheduled operations at [JFK].").
90 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF ECONOMICS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, NOTICE No. 08-04, IN THE MATTER OF CONGESTION MANAGEMENT RULE FOR
LAGUARDIA AIRPORT 4 (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/06/VO80015com-
ment.pdf (noting that "[r]elieving congestion alone does not necessarily accom-
plish an optimal outcome; ideally the allocation should be efficient."). The
report also notes that using non-market based slot allocation methods, such as
allocation via administrative assignment, is undesirable because it is "likely ineffi-
cient." Id. at 5.
91 See Press Release, FAA, supra note 15.
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their competitors from acquiring them. 2 Therefore, capping
slots, absent some other offsetting action, produces as its unin-
tentional byproduct higher airfares, an anticompetitive environ-
ment, and opportunities for predation. According to the DOT,
"airfares at capped airports run [eleven] to [fifteen] percent
higher" than at non-capped airports. 11 Incumbent airlines gen-
erally approve of caps at airports they already serve since caps
artificially protect their market share while reducing opportuni-
ties for new competitors to enter. 94 Incumbent carrier support
for caps (alone) at the New York-area airports "makes sense, be-
cause limited competition makes [the incumbent carriers] more
profitable and protects them from new entrants that might want
to compete by offering lower fares." 95 A system of "straight
caps," then, counters competition, facilitates predation, and
generally encourages economic inefficiency-all of which com-
bine to provide fertile ground for higher fares at capped
airports.9 6
92 See Gleimer, supra note 14, at 907-08. This practice is known as "slot hoard-
ing." See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
93 Press Release, Dep't of Transp., U.S. Transportation Secretary Mary E. Pe-
ters Announces $89 Million Commitment to Capacity Improvements atJFK Inter-
national Airport, Releases Final Rules to Improve Service, Keep Fares
Competitive at New York's 3 Capped Airports (Oct. 9, 2008) [hereinafter DOT
Press Release], http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dotl5008.htm. The DOT is not the
only governmental organization to recognize this. On the contrary, the GAO,
which opposes the slot-auction plan, has concluded, "airports [served by fewer
carriers] tend to have higher airfares than airports with more competition from
airlines." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/01-518T, AVIATION COMPETITION:
CHALLENGES IN ENHANCING COMPETITION IN DOMINATED MARKETS 2 (2001).
94 See Outlook for Summer Air Travel: Addressing Congestion and Delay, Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Outlook
for Summer Air Travel] (statement of Henry Krakowski, Chief Operating Officer,
Air Traffic Organization), available at http://www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news
_story.cfm?newsId=10257.
95 Id.
96 Id. (referring to the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Low COST ARLINE
SERVICE REVOLUTION, (1996), http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/Data/lowcos-
trevo.pdf). The report discusses types of anticompetitive and predatory behavior
among carries. "Slot hoarding" is one example of airline predation and occurs
when a carrier uses very small aircraft in insubstantial markets to the exclusion of
potential new entrant carriers that would prefer to use those same slots for
higher-demand, more competitive routes. The slot-hoarding carrier technically
uses the slot so as not to forfeit it, but only as a means to bar its competitors from
entering the market. See DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Low COST AiRLINE
SERVICE REVOLUTION at 31; see also Gleimer, supra note 14, at 908-10. Another
example of predation occurs when carriers artificially increase their operations in
advance of an FAA rule imposing slot caps. This way, the carriers enlarge their
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While slot capping may not be a new congestion management
technique, auctioning slots to the highest bidder is.9 7 In keep-
ing with its stated goal of reducing air congestion in New York's
airspace, but to avoid the anticompetitive ill effects that slot caps
provoke, the FAA has now proposed a novel, two-pronged mar-
ket-based solution for reducing New York air traffic down to
manageable, delay-free levels.
B. THE MECHANICS OF THE FAA's CONTROVERSIAL
SLOT AUCTION PLAN
The FAA's slot auction plan espouses the following approach.
First, relying on its regulatory authority as codified in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(b) (2000) (§ 40103(b)), the FAA will continue to cap
slots at each of the three airports.98 Caps for both JFK and EWR
are set at eighty-one slots per hour. 99 Slots at LGA are capped
at seventy-one per hour from 6 a.m. to 9:59 p.m. 10 To thwart
the undesirable anticompetitive byproduct, the FAA proposes a
second prong in its congestion management plan: a limited
number of slots will be withdrawn from the incumbent carriers
and then auctioned to the highest bidder in a way that ensures
"the New York aviation market [remains] open to new services
that [will] promote competitive fares" despite the limited num-
ber of slots available.10 1 This second prong of the FAA's plan
has stirred considerable consternation among the many inter-
ested parties.
The mechanics of the second prong work as follows: as part of
the auction, most of the existing slots at all three airports will be
"grandfathered" to their original (i.e., current) owners. 10 2 This
will allow incumbent carriers to retain the vast majority of the
slots they already operate. In this way, the auction plan avoids
causing financial harm to those carriers that have made substan-
share of the base from which slots are then allocated. Hearing on Aviation Delays,
supra note 3, at 8.
97 Letter from Steven A. Engel, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice (DOJ) to Kerry B. Long, Chief Counsel of the FAA, at 3-4 (Oct. 7, 2008)
[hereinafter DOJ Letter], available at http://wwv.dot.gov/affairs/OLCltr.pdf.
98 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,544; the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at
60,576.
- The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,546.
100 The LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,576. The LGA slot cap restrictions re-
present a four-slot decrease in daily slots versus the current cap of seventy-five.
DOT Press Release, supra note 93. Those four slots are considered "retired." Id.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., The LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,576.
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tial capital investments at one or more of the New York airports
by allowing those carriers to retain the majority of their slots
through the "grandfather" mechanism. I°3 Carriers will hold
these slots (called "common slots") as lease agreements for ten
years. 104 AtJFK and EWR, each carrier will retain one hundred
percent of its current slots up to twenty, plus ninety percent of
all of its slots over twenty. 10 5 The FAA will then auction those
slots withdrawn from eligible carriers (initially called "limited
slots") to successful bidders over a staggered five-year period.10 6
Those slots awarded through the withdrawal-and-auction pro-
cess will have shorter leases.10 7 Once the limited slots are auc-
tioned and leased to the highest bidder, they then become
"unrestricted" slots. The unrestricted slots, unlike common and
limited slots, will not be subject to withdrawal by the FAA, but
will instead expire at the end of the specified lease term. 108 At
LGA, the plan works similarly, however the FAA will simultane-
ously retire a small number of slots in order to bring flight oper-
103 Many carriers have invested significant sums in airport facility improve-
ments (e.g., terminal and gate improvements). Hearing on Aviation Delays, supra
note 3, at 11. For example, American Airlines opened a new terminal atJFK in
August 2007, a project costing more than $1.3 billion. See Mayor Bloomberg
Launches 'Just Ask The Locals," A Campaign to Welcome and Thank Visitors From
Around the World, AMERICAN AIRLINES UPDAATE, Sept. 2007, http://www.american
airlines.jp/content/images/jp/ta/pdf/UPDAATE ENGSep_2007.pdf. Thus, a
significant loss of slots by American atJFK would almost certainly result in a lower
return on its capital improvement investments at the airport. Some recognition
of a carrier's historical slot rights at a particular airport is therefore warranted.
Notably, the FAA's auction plan accounts for this reality by requiring incumbent
carriers to forfeit only a very small number of their slots.
104 See, e.g., the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,576-77. Carriers will hold their
common slots just as they do today: those slots will be subject to an eighty percent
usage requirement (known as the "use-or-lose" rule), and the FAA can cancel or
withdraw common slots, as it has in other instances, for operational need or if
"the FAA determine[s] the cap at the airport is too high." See id. at 60,577.
105 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,546-47. Those carriers with twenty
slots or less will not be required to relinquish any. Id.
106 See FAA, LIMITED SLOT ALLOCATION, 6-23 (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.faa.
gov/about/office-org/headquartersoffices/aep/nyauctions/media/limited
slot allocation.pdf. Not all "limited slots" will be subject to the auction process at
once. Pursuant to the FAA's plan, incumbent carriers will return their limited
slots on a specified schedule ranging from zero to four years. For instance, if the
carrier's particular limited slot is assigned a reversion factor of "0," it reverts to
the FAA and is auctioned off immediately. If, on the other hand, the slot is as-
signed a factor of "4," the carrier continues to hold and use the slot for the next
four years, at which time the slot reverts to the FAA and is then auctioned. See
STAFF OF THE BuREAu OF ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 3.
107 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,547.
108 Id.
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ations per hour down to seventy-one from the current seventy-
five. 109 At LGA, each carrier will retain one hundred percent of
its slots up to twenty, plus approximately eighty-five percent of
slots over twenty." 0 Of the remaining fifteen percent, the FAA
will retire one-third and reallocate by auction the remaining
two-thirds over a five-year period. I"' According to the FAA, the
combination of capping the New York area airports (to bring
aircraft operations in line with airport/airspace capability) cou-
pled with the auction of a limited number of slots, will both ease
air traffic congestion and foster (or at least not impair)
competition. "12
The FAA recognizes that it lacks express regulatory authority to
reallocate slots by auction. 13 This is primarily because an ap-
propriations rider imposing restrictions on FAA spending pro-
vides that "none of [the FAA's appropriations] funds.., shall be
available for the [FAA] to finalize or implement any regulation
that would promulgate new aviation user fees not specifically au-
thorized by law. . . ."14 Thus, the rider prevents the FAA from
engaging in expenditures that would construct new aviation
user fees, and so the FAA must look to other authority to con-
duct the auctions."15 The agency finds this alternate authority in
a unique combination of its regulatory power on the one hand,
and its property-disposal powers on the other. According to the
FAA, its authority to auction slots rests on a unique "bifurcated
approach:" (1) the FAA first uses its regulatory authority granted
by § 40103(b)-as it has done in the past and without meaning-
ful opposition-to institute the slot caps at the New York air-
ports, but (2) relies on its transaction authority to reallocate slots
109 The LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,576.
110 Id. at 60,576-77.
111 Id. at 60,577.
112 See Bidder Seminar, supra note 17, at 4.
113 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, supra note 56, at
20,852 (noting that the "FAA continues to believe that it cannot rely on a market-
based allocation method under a purely regulatory approach ....").
114 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat.
1844, 2379 (2007) (emphasis added).
115 But see, DOJ Letter, supra note 97, at 2-5 (opining that proceeds from the
slot auction plan would not constitute new aviation user fees because, among
other reasons, there is no correlation between the amount an airline bids for a
slot and the cost to the FAA to provide ATC services to the user. As such, pro-
ceeds from the auction would not meet the established legal definition of "user
fees."). The DOJ did not offer an opinion on whether the FAA correctly inter-
prets its property disposition authority, though notably, the Department is de-
fending the FAA in the current law suit pending before the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 2.
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by auction.11 6 The FAA derives its transaction authority from 49
U.S.C. §§ 106 (2000) and 40110 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (herein-
after, "§ 106" and "§ 40110" respectively)." 7 Specifically, the
FAA relies on § 106(n), which allows the agency to construct or
acquire "such other real and personal property (including office
space and patents)" as the FAA Administrator may deem neces-
sary. ll ' Thus, when the FAA creates a slot, it "constructs" intan-
gible property in accordance with § 106(n). Then, under a
combination of § 106(1) (6)-which allows the FAA "to enter
into and perform . . . leases . . . or other transactions as may be
necessary to carry out the functions of [the FAA] 9-and
§ 40110(a) (2)-which authorizes the FAA to "dispose of an in-
terest in property for adequate consideration"°2 0 -the FAA pro-
poses to lease its newly constructed property (i.e., the slots) to
the carrier that bids the highest for that contract. Therefore,
according to the FAA's theory, its power to cap slots and its
power to construct and lease property coalesce to form the basis
of its total grant of authority to conduct the auction.
121
Notably, the FAA does not consider its auction plan a perma-
nent solution to the air traffic congestion problems, but instead
calls it a temporary measure. 22 The ultimate, longer-term goal
is to increase air capacity in the New York area by expanding
airport facilities and by launching other capital improvements.
123 For example, the DOT recently signed a "Letter of Intent" to
invest millions of dollars atJFK to increase the airport's capacity
by, for example, constructing new high-speed runway exit taxi-
ways. 124 The slot caps at the area airports are thus temporary
116 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,547-48; the LGA Plan, supra note 9,
at 60,577-79.
117 The JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,547; the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at
60,577-79.
I's See 49 U.S.C. § 106(n) (2000).
119 See 49 U.S.C. § 106(1) (6) (2000).
120 49 U.S.C. § 40110(a) (2) (2000).
121 See the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,547; the LGA Plan, supra note 9,
at 60,577.
122 DOT Press Release, supra note 93.
123 Id. (noting that "'[t]he best way to cut record airline delays nationwide is to
expand the limited capacity at New York's airport[s]"'). Since building new air-
port infrastructure and overhauling the airspace system take time, however, the
capping and slot-auction plan is designed to reduce delays and ease congestion
until the infrastructure improvements can be built. Id.
124 Id. High-speed exit taxiways allow landing aircraft to clear active runways
more quickly, which in turn allows those aircraft in the queue for landing to land
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measures put into place "until the capacity improvements can
come on line. 125
C. AIR CARRIERS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS PROTEST THE
SLOT AUCTION PLAN
Perhaps unsurprisingly, several air carriers protested the
FAA's proposed plan, both directly and through the ATA. 126
The protestors raise three principal arguments. First, the ATA
asserts that the FAA's bifurcated approach is misguided and that
the FAA untenably stretches to discover statutory authority
where none exists.127 Necessarily incorporated into this argu-
ment are two implicit threshold questions: (1) whether or not
slots are property (so that they can be leased pursuant to the
FAA's property management authority), and (2) even if they
are, whether the FAA possesses any interest to dispose. 12 Only
if a slot is property in which the FAA has an interest can the FAA
dispose of that interest (via lease) pursuant to its property man-
agement powers. 129 Secondly, the ATA argues that the FAA's
interpretation of its own authority proves too much. If slots are
indeed a form of property, then confiscating those slots consti-
tutes a Fifth Amendment "taking" and thus offends constitution-
ally guaranteed due process requirements.13 Third, the ATA
asserts that the FAA's plan does not create the efficient use of
airspace, but instead "distorts the operation of market forces
more quickly and without the need for holding patterns or for greater spacing
between other landing aircraft. See id.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Comments of the Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc., In re Supplemental
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia
Airport, FAA Docket No. FAA-2006-25709 (june 16, 2008) [hereinafter ATA's
Comments Concerning LGA], available at http://www.airlines.org/government/
agency/ (follow the "LaGuardia SNPRM" hyperlink); Comments of the Air
Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc., In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Congestion
Management for John F. Kennedy International Airport and Newark Liberty In-
ternational Airport, FAA Docket No. FAA-2008-0517 (July 21, 2008) [hereinafter
ATA's Comments Concerning JFK/EWR], available at http://www.airlines.org/
government/agency/ (follow the "Kennedy and Newark Congestion Manage-
ment NPRM" hyperlink).
127 See ATA's Comments Concerning JFK/EWR, supra note 126, at 6-10.
128 Id. at 11-13.
129 Id. at 11.
130 Id. at 18-19; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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and constricts competition-by forcing unwilling sellers to
transfer slots they would prefer to retain .... 31
D. THE ATA AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES FILE SUIT
The FAA and those opposing the slot auctions have been una-
ble to reach a satisfactory resolution. Given that the FAA de-
cided to proceed with its plan even in the face of the GAO's
opinion letter, 13 2 the ATA and other interested parties filed suit
in the Federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 133 The
court has issued a temporary stay barring the FAA from proceed-
ing with the auctions; however, the case is still in its embryonic
stages. 134 The court no doubt faces a formidable task. Central
to the thrust of the case is this thorny issue: whether the FAA's
proposed slot auction plan represents a legitimate exercise of its
legal authority.
IV. IS THE SLOT AUCTION PLAN LEGAL?
A. AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION IS REQUIRED
Before addressing the legal merits of the FAA's plan, we must
begin from the premise that a solution to the congestion prob-
lem is not only warranted, but critical. There can be little doubt
that the congestion crisis in New York requires an immediate
solution. With rising delays, the spillover effect, 135 and worsen-
ing passenger conditions associated with the delays, the need for
, ATA's Comments Concerning JFK/EWR, supra note 126, at 24. The ATA
and the airlines set out a variety of alternative theories to support their position
that the slot auction is illegal including, for example, that the auction constitutes
a new and impermissible tax on air carriers and that the auction plan violates the
Anti-Deficiency Act. Because this comment focuses on the FAA's legal authority
for commencing the auction, the alternative arguments urged by the ATA are not
addressed herein.
132 See, e.g., theJFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,546 (the FAA opines that the
slot auction plans "represent novel legal issues upon which reasonable people,
and agencies, acting in good faith, have disagreed. The FAA disagrees with the
GAO conclusions and has decided to proceed" with the adoption of the EWR/
JFK and LGA plans).
133 See, e.g., Petition for Review, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, No. 08-
1331 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2008). Other entities also filed suit against the FAA
including, for example, the Port Authority for New York and several airlines. By
order of the court, the several suits were consolidated on December 12, 2008.
Order to Consolidate Cases, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, Case No. 08-
1333 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2008) (on file with the author).
134 See Order to Stay Case Pending Court Review, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc.
v. FAA, No. 08-1333 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2008) (on file with author).
135 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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a quick fix is beyond peradventure. Apart from the obvious det-
rimental impact on the individual traveler,' 36 air traffic delays
cost the nation's economy between $8.5 billion and $40 billion
annually. 137
Absent a market-based solution, airlines are not likely to re-
strain themselves when it comes to capacity management. 138
Moreover, as we have seen, slot caps alone, without a concomi-
tant market-based allocation method, encourage anticompeti-
tive behavior and increase airfares.139  Thus, governmental
action is not only warranted, but necessary. The FAA, as the
agency designated and authorized to control the nation's air-
space, is the right entity to intervene.
Underpinning this quandary, then, is the implicit acceptance
of the need for some solution to the congestion problem in New
York. In light of the current economic recession in the U.S.,
which has dampened the demand for air travel and impacted
carriers' revenue streams, many carriers have reduced, or will
soon reduce, scheduled flights and will drawn down capacity by
retiring older aircraft and by delaying delivery of new ones.1 40
Because of the capacity draw down, congestion in the New York
area, and the nation's airspace generally, may not be as pressing
a problem as it was in the summer of 2007. However, in light of
the cyclical nature of the airline industry, any industry downturn
136 Impacted travelers include those flying into or out of the New York area, as
well as those travelers impacted by "down-line" delays caused by the spillover ef-
fect. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
137 The cost ranges vary depending on the source and depth of the analysis,
though all estimates peg the cost in the billions-of-dollars range. Compare, SHERRY
& DONOHUE, supra note 57, at 5 (estimating the annual cost of delays at $8.5
billion) with Outlook for Summer Air Travel, supra note 94 (citing study by the Sen-
ate Joint Economic Committee which estimates the annual cost at $40 billion).
138 See Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 1; see also Congestion Management Rule
for LaGuardia Airport, supra note 56, at 20,847 (noting that the FAA experi-
mented with lifting the slot caps atJFK in January 2007. Once the FAA removed
the caps, airline over-scheduling caused a "system overload" at JFK, contributing
in part to the summer 2007 congestion debacle.).
139 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Brian Straus, Southwest Suffers Second Quarterly Loss, Plans "Unprece-
dented" 2009 Capacity Cut, AIR TRANsP. WKLY., Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://
www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storylD=15345 (noting that Southwest Air-
lines, for the first time, would shrink capacity in 2009 an a year-over-year basis);
Perry Flint, AMR Posts Heavy Fourth-Quarter, Annual Losses, Sees Capacity Down 6.5 %




is certainly only temporary. 14 Even assuming that air traffic de-
creases considerably overall, it is nevertheless likely that "most
congested airports, particularly in the New York/New Jersey re-
gion, will not see a significant reduction."' 4 2 As such, despite
the notion that current airline capacity in New York may have
lessened year over year, the congestion crisis in New York, if
abated at all, no doubt requires continued attention. 14 3
B. THE FAA PROPERLY RELIES ON ITS COMBINED REGULATORY
AND PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
TO QUELL A PRESSING PROBLEM
The FAA's slot auction plan constitutes a noble, bull-by-the-
horns effort to quell a pressing problem. The FAA's attempts to
protect the delay-weary public are heartening. Admittedly, its
bifurcated approach is concededly novel. As one might expect,
novelty usually stirs controversy in legal matters, and the FAA's
interpretation of its legal authority presents no exception.
Upon consideration and analysis, however, while airline resis-
tance is understandable, the slot auction plan does not represent
an untenable or unreasonable interpretation of the FAA's total
grant of authority. On the contrary, as we shall see, Congress's
grant of power to the FAA was meant to broadly address
problems just like the one presented here.
From the outset, however, we must address a glaring peculiar-
ity: the FAA has itself publicly stated that it lacks the power to
implement a slot auction scheme. As recently as 2006, the FAA
explained that "legislation would be necessary to employ mar-
ket-based approaches such as auctions ... because the FAA cur-
rently does not have the statutory authority to assess market-
clearing charges for a [slot].' 4  The FAA, though, has ex-
plained that it made those previous statements solely in view of
141 Current Situation and Future Outlook of U.S. Commercial Airline Industry: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 109th
Cong. 17 (2005) (statement of Steven A. Morrison, Professor and Chair, Depart-
ment of Economics, Northeastern University) (noting that the airline industry
has always been cyclical "because the demand for air travel is sensitive to the level
of economic activity").
142 See Outlook for Summer Air Travel, supra note 94, at 1. Even if New York air-
ports experience a lessening of congestion in the short run, the cyclical nature of
the industry means that congestion will likely exceed 2007 levels in the future. Id.
at 1-2.
143 See generally Whalen et al., supra note 25, at 7.
- Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, supra note 86, at
51,362; see also id. at 51,363 ("The FAA currently does not have full legislative
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§ 40103 and without consideration of its property disposition
powers. 145 After further consideration, the FAA has recanted its
former statements in favor of its latest approach.'46 Therefore,
despite the FAA's previous position on the matter, this comment
will evaluate the efficacy of the agency's most recent position,
and concludes that the FAA is empowered to implement the slot
auction scheme.
To begin with, when an agency is charged with administering
a statute, that agency's construction of the statute is entitled to
substantial deference.147 Thus, a reviewing court must start
from the premise that the FAA's interpretation of its own au-
thority under its proposed bifurcated approach is correct, unless
there are "compelling indications" that the agency's interpreta-
tion is wrong. 48 Pursuant to § 40103, the U.S. Government
maintains exclusive sovereignty over the nation's airspace, 14
and the FAA has broad authority to manage that airspace. 150
Specifically, the FAA Administrator possesses the power to "de-
velop plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and
assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary to
ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace." '151
Importantly, under § 40101 (a) (6), Congress has unequivocally
underscored the importance of market-based solutions and
competitive forces with respect to air transportation. 15 2 In carry-
ing out her duties, the Secretary of Transportation (who has ul-
timate responsibility for the FAA) is required to place
"maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and
potential competition.'1 53 The FAA's broad authority, however, is
concededly not unbridled. Its regulatory power is constrained
by the appropriations rider prohibiting it from imposing new
authority to employ [auctions] .... Consequently, we are seeking the legislative
authority to conduct auctions ....").
145 See the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,548.
146 Id. (noting that when the FAA made prior statements concerning its lack of
authority to implement market-based mechanisms like slot auctions, it was refer-
ring specifically and only to its power under § 40103 and was not addressing its
authority to dispose of property under §§ 106(l) and (n)).
147 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1315 (8th Cir.
1981) (citing Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980)).
148 See id.
149 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2000).
150 See Northwest Airlines, 645 F.2d at 1315; see also theJFK/EWR Plan, supra note
1, at 60,544.
1-1 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2000).
152 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
153 Id. (emphasis added).
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aviation user fees.154 Even so, it is clear that the FAA possesses
authority to take action of some sort, and indeed, it has success-
fully done so in the past even over the objection of air
carriers.'55
In Northwest Airlines v. Goldschmidt, Northwest contested the
FAA's authority to allocate slots at Washington D.C.'s National
Airport (National).' 56 The FAA had proposed slot controls at
the airport because of "severe congestion, resulting in numer-
ous and substantial delays." 157 Until 1980, air carriers serving
National determined, by agreement among themselves, how
they would divvy up available slots. 158 In October 1980, however,
the carriers were unable to reach an accord principally because
a new entrant carrier, New York Air, wanted to begin competing
in the lucrative New York-Washington shuttle market by offering
several flights during peak times of the day.159 Because the car-
riers could not arrive at a mutual agreement that would include
making room for the new entrant, the FAA-after seeking pub-
lic comments and suggestions on a proper allocation method-
issued a rule distributing slots among all carriers according to a
formula based on each carrier's previous months' allocations. 6 °
The FAA required National's incumbent carriers to yield or
move a number of their slots in order to make room for New
York Air.' 6' Northwest,'6 2 employing arguments strikingly simi-
lar to those made in the current slot-auction matter, challenged
the FAA's plan outright by contending that the agency "ha[d]
no statutory authority to allocate slots among carriers." 163 The
154 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, supra note 114.
155 See generally Northwest Airlines, 645 F.2d 1309.
156 Id. at 1311.
157 Id. at 1312.
158 Id. The carriers were able to coordinate schedules and agree on slot alloca-
tion because of a grant of antitrust immunity from the then-existing Civil Aero-
nautics Board. Id.
159 Id. at 1312-13. In order to compete effectively against the shuttle product
of the incumbent carrier, Eastern Airlines, New York Air sought twenty slots, or
ten take-offs and landings per day. Id. at 1313.
160 Id. at 1313.
161 Id.
162 Several other carriers joined in the suit, including for example, Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Delta Air Lines, and American Airlines. Id. at 1311 n.1.
163 Id. at 1313. Northwest unsuccessfully challenged the FAA's actions on
other grounds too. See id. Those alternative grounds are beyond the scope of
this comment.
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FAA defended on the grounds that 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) 164 al-
lowed the FAA to, among other things, "formulate policy with
respect to the use of the navigable airspace . . . under such
terms, conditions, and limitations as [it] may deem necessary
.... "165 The FAA argued that § 1348(a) clearly endowed the
FAA with authority to allocate slots at National. 166 New York Air
was thus able to enter the National market pursuant to the
FAA's slot allocation scheme.167
The court recognized that the FAA has "responsibility and au-
thority not only for aviation safety but also for airspace manage-
ment."'68 Thus, held the court, the FAA possessed the power to
allocate the slots in the manner it proposed, including withdraw-
ing slots from incumbent carriers and reallocating them to the
new entrant carrier. 169 In light of Northwest Airlines, it is obvious
that the FAA possesses clear authority to implement some sort of
slot allocation system. The question that remains, then, is this: if
the FAA possesses general authority to withdraw and allocate
slots, can it do so using a market-based auction program? The
answer is an unequivocal yes.
As discussed above, because the FAA, as it concedes, lacks the
regulatory authority to auction slots, 1 70 it relies on its property
management authority to conduct the auction.171 Thus, if the
FAA's argument is to pass muster with a reviewing court, the
FAA must demonstrate a crucial predicate: it must prove that
slots are "property" within the meaning of §§ 106(1) (6) and
106(n), the FAA's property management provisions. The FAA
has stated previously that "[s]lots do not represent a property
right but represent an operating privilege subject to absolute
164 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) preceded the current 49 U.S.C. § 40103-the same
statute that the FAA currently cites as part of its authority to implement the auc-
tion plan. The language of the former statute and that of the current one are
similar, and there is no substantive difference between the two. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103 (2000).
165 Northwest Airlines, 645 F.2d at 1315 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a)).
166 Id.
167 Ultimately New York Air was awarded eighteen slots. Special Federal Avia-
tion Regulation; Temporary Allocation of IFR Reservations [slots] at Washington
National Airport, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,637 (Nov. 3, 1980).
168 Northwest Airlines, 645 F.2d at 1316.
169 See id.
170 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, supra note 56, at
20,852.
171 See generally discussion supra Part III.B.
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FAA control."'7 2 For example, in In re Gull Air, Inc.,' the FAA
argued that it possessed the authority to withdraw LGA slots
from a bankrupt airline that was no longer using them. 74 The
airline protested, arguing that the slots had become property of
the bankrupt carrier's estate, and thus that the Bankruptcy
Code's automatic stay provisions barred the FAA from seizing
the slots. 1 7 5 The FAA contended that the slots were "not prop-
erty of the carrier to which they are allocated . *... ,17' The
court, recognizing a split among courts that had previously ad-
dressed the issue, held that slots used by a carrier do become
property of the carrier's estate in bankruptcy. 117 Other courts
reviewing this issue have held similarly. 178 Slots, in fact, are ac-
tively treated as property by the airlines themselves, which com-
monly sublease and sell them for consideration, use them as
forms of collateral, '79 and report them as assets in financial
statements. 180 Thus, slots are unequivocally a form of property.
Importantly, slots issued under previous FAA orders, although
property in the hands of the carriers, nonetheless contain signif-
172 In re McClain Airlines, Inc., 80 B.R. 175, 178 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987) (citing
14 C.F.R. § 93.223) (emphasis added). The FAA in its latest slot auction plan,
however, recognizes that auctioned slots grant a property interest to the success-
ful bidder since the auctioned slots will be leased. See, e.g., the LGA Plan, supra
note 9, at 60,578 ("slots are an intangible form of property that may be leased.").
173 890 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1989).
174 Id. at 1256-57.
175 Id. at 1257.
176 Id. at 1258.
177 Id. at 1259-60. The court noted that the ability of carriers to buy and sell
slots on a secondary market gave them the characteristics of traditional property.
Id. at 1260. The court, however, determined that since Gull Air's slots had ex-
pired under their own terms, they could no longer be considered the carrier's
(or the estate's) property. Id. at 1260-61.
178 See In re McClain Airlines, 80 B.R. 175, 178 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987); Am.
Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. O'Hare Reg'l Carrier Scheduling Comm., 52 B.R. 567,
570-71 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
179 See the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,549; see also Gleimer, supra note
14, at 902-07.
180 See, e.g., Press Release, Southwest Airlines, Inc., Southwest Airlines Seeks
Rights to Operate at LaGuardia Airport, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.southwest.
com/about swa/press/prindex.html (noting that Southwest bid $7.5 million dol-
lars for fourteen slots-seven daily take-offs and landings-at LGA airport. The
slots were previously held by ATA Airlines, Inc., which filed for bankruptcy in
April, 2008). See also Order Approving the Debtor's Selection of Southwest Air-
lines, In re ATA Airlines, Inc., Case No. 08-03675-BHL-1 1, (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Dec.
2, 2008) (on file with the author) (approving of Southwest's bid for the LGA
slots).
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icant restrictions, and the FAA often imposes conditions that, if
unfulfilled, will lead to slot withdrawal or reversion. 181
The fact that slots may be property in the hands of carriers,
however, does not necessarily mean that they are property in the
FAA's hands, just as the GAO urged in its legal opinion to Con-
gress on the slot auction issue.18 2 Rather, the GAO concluded-
with scant analysis to support its conclusion-that slots consti-
tute licenses to use the nation's airspace system.'83 Having per-
functorily concluded that slots are licenses, the GAO then relied
on Cleveland v. United States"8 4 for the proposition that licenses
are not property while in the hands of the issuing agency. 5 In
Cleveland, the FBI charged a gaming entrepreneur with multiple
counts of money laundering, racketeering, and conspiracy after
the FBI discovered the entrepreneur "participated in a scheme
to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the
video poker industry.' 8 6 To support these charges, the govern-
ment relied on 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (§ 1341)-a mail fraud
statute-that, among other things, prohibits the use of the mails
to defraud others. 87 The question presented in Cleveland, as
stated by the court, was "whether, for purposes of the federal mail
fraud statute, a government regulator parts with 'property' when
it issues a [federal] license."18 The court held that "§ 1341 does
not reach fraud in obtaining a state or municipal license of the kind
here involved, for such a license is not 'property' in the govern-
ment regulator's hands.' 89 The court reached this conclusion
in part by finding that a state-issued video poker license repre-
sented an exercise of state police powers, akin to licenses to
transport and sell alcoholic beverages or to sell corporate stock.
181 See, e.g., Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport; Notice of
Order, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,854, 77,858-60 (Dec. 27, 2006) (requiring that carriers
must use their LGA slots eighty percent of the time or else the slots would be
subject to withdrawal by the FAA). The usage requirement is known informally
as the "use-or-lose" rule. In re Gull Air, 890 F.2d at 1261. Slots also, by their
terms, revert to the FAA at the expiration of the rule that created or allocated
them. Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. at
77,860 ("When the final Order expires, any [slots held by carriers at LGA] will
revert to the FAA for reallocation ....").
182 See the GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 10-11.
183 Id. at 11.
184 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
185 See the GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 11.
186 Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 16.
187 Id. at 16-17 (referring to, and quoting, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000)).
188 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
189 Id. (emphasis added).
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190 The court noted that to import "traditional concepts of
property" into its reading of § 1341 would transform a "wide
range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and local author-
ities" into new "federal criminal jurisdiction."'' 91 The court, in
unusual perfervid tone, noted that if a state-issued license con-
ferred a property right in the state, "one could scarcely avoid the
conclusion that States have property rights in any license or per-
mit requiring an upfront fee, including drivers' licenses, medi-
cal licenses, and fishing and hunting licenses."' 92 Finally, the
court found the word "property" to be ambiguous as used within
§ 1341, and because the case involved a criminal defendant, the
court was bound to resolve the ambiguity "in favor of lenity."'' 93
With respect to the slot auctions, Cleveland is clearly inappo-
site and easily distinguishable. In the first place, the GAO cites
no authority for its unsupported, but essential predicate that
slots constitute licenses by the FAA."' 4 Whether slots-which
the FAA will allocate via leaseholds under its plan-are licenses
similar to the gaming permits at issue is Cleveland is doubtful.'95
Unlike a license to drive, sell alcohol, sell stock, hunt, fish, or
operate video gaming devices, slot leases are freely transferable
among carriers, and the transferability does not depend on FAA
approval.'96  Thus, the GAO's legal argument-which un-
soundly assumes as its premise that slots are licenses and not
leases-begins on unsteady footing. Moreover, Cleveland-a
criminal case-concerned itself with the proprietary interest of
a state in licenses it issued pursuant to state legislation in exercise
of state police powers. 197 The FAA slot auction program, on the
190 See id. at 21.
191 Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
192 Id. at 22; see also, the GAO Opinion, supra note 20, at 11.
193 Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 25 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812
(1971)).
194 See generally the GAO Opinion, supra note 20.
195 In the proposed slot-lease contract itself, the FAA endeavors to grant a pos-
sessory interest in the designated airspace at the time specified in the lease. See
generally Proposed Lease Agreement Between Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and [blank in which the carrier's name is to be added], http://www.air
lines.org/government/Court+Filings/ (follow the "ATA Petition on Slot Auc-
tions" hyperlink; then follow the "ATA Petition for Review, Exhibit 1: Notice of
Slot Lease Auction" hyperlink). Leases, by their terms, expire in five-year incre-
ments. Id. at 1.
196 Id. at 3 ("Nothing shall prohibit lessee from selling or subleasing the [slot]
Lease in secondary markets or using the lease as collateral; provided, however,
that the FAA receives notice" of the sale or sublease).
197 Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 22.
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other hand, concerns a federal agency and that agency's interpre-
tation of a federal statute that, by its terms, grants the agency the
exclusive right and the broad authority to manage federal air-
space. Unlike the issue in Cleveland, there is no danger that the
slot auction scheme will wrest power from the state or local au-
thorities in favor of federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's
implicit concerns in Cleveland-concerns about disturbing the
fragile balance of power between federal and state govern-
ment-are thus inapplicable in the instant matter. With respect
to the nation's airspace system, the federal government already,
by statute, possesses complete sovereignty over that domain. 198
In addition, the Supreme Court in Cleveland carefully circum-
scribed its opinion, confining its interpretation of the word
"property" to the mail fraud statute specifically-a statute that
imposes criminal liability on those who violate its terms. 99
Thus, the Court's restrictive reading of the word "property" for
purposes of § 1341 is hardly transferable to any interpretations
of "property" as used in § 106. One must look to the legislative
history of the FAA's property management authority, rather
than a criminal mail fraud statute, for guidance in construing
the meaning of "property" as it relates to the FAA's authority.
200
That legislative history reveals that in 1996 Congress intended to
reform and revolutionize the FAA in such a way as to "create
incentives for the agency to make necessary improvements in the
performance of the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system. '20 1 The
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
presciently presaged the current strain on the air traffic system
when it noted "the demand for air transportation services will
increase dramatically over the next several years, while available
resources will not be adequate to meet demand.' 20 2 Thus, noted the
Committee, "the focus must now be on enacting legislation to
make comprehensive changes in how the FAA conducts its busi-
ness and to remedy inefficiencies within the organization and its
ATC system."'20 3 In specific reference to the FAA's property man-
198 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2000) ("The United States Government has
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.").
199 Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 25.
200 The property management authority on which the FAA relies came into
existence in 1996 as the Air Traffic Management System Performance Improve-
ment Act of 1996. See S. REP. No. 104-251, at 1 (1996).
201 Id. (emphasis added).




agement authority, the Committee declared that the then-new
provisions would "provide broad, general authority for the
[FAA] to enter into contracts, leases. . ." and other agreements
"to carry out the functions of the FAA. ' 204 The Committee in-
tended that the new provisions would grant "broad authority" to
the FAA to "acquire, construct, improve, repair, and maintain
air traffic control ... facilities ... as well as other real and per-
sonal property. ' 20 There is no indication that Congress meant
to in any way constrain the FAA's property management author-
ity or that it used the word "property" in a restrictive or atypical
sense. On the contrary, as noted above, the legislative history
reveals that Congress bestowed substantial, broad authority
upon the FAA to combat inefficiencies within the air traffic net-
work. 206
Finally, unlike Cleveland's state-issued video poker licenses, the
national airspace is already considered public property.207 In ac-
cordance with § 40103, the FAA alone is the sole entity author-
ized to orchestrate movement within that navigable airspace.208
Thus, when the FAA creates a slot for purposes of movement
through the airspace (recognized as a property interest by the
courts), it "constructs" a property interest in the airspace system
by conferring the exclusive right of access (to a body of public
property) at a particular point in time.20 9 This is a far cry from
granting a license to operate video poker machines. The latter
does not grant a leasehold or access to a body of existing public
property, but rather authorizes its holder to conduct an activity
under the rigors of state supervision.2 10 In this regard, video
poker licenses are more akin to patents, which do not become
property of the licensee until the government issues the pat-
ent.211 While the federal government may have no property in-
204 Id. at 23 (encouraging the FAA to use its authority to enter into contracts
and favorably underscoring the potential revenue that the FAA may be able to
claim as a result). Notably, one of the FAA's principal functions is to manage the
nation's airspace. § 40103.
205 Id. at 24.
206 Id. at 1.
207 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946); Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc.
v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
208 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2000) ("The United States Government has exclusive
sovereignty of airspace of the United States.").
20- See 49 U.S.C. § 106(n) (1) (2000) (granting the FAA the right to construct
real or personal property, or any interest in such property).
210 See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000).
211 Id. at 23-24.
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terest in an unissued patent, the same cannot be said of the
nation's navigable airspace.
Moreover, even if slots are licenses, they would be licenses to
use the nation's navigable airspace. As noted, Congress has al-
ready declared, and the courts have thus recognized, that the
FAA possesses exclusive sovereignty over the airspace and is
charged with its control and efficient management. 212 Thus, the
FAA maintains some property interest in the slots even if it does
not own them outright, because only the FAA has the authority
to assign the use of airspace 213 and because slots, by their terms,
revert to FAA control under certain, stated conditions. 214 As
such, the FAA possesses the right to part with a portion of that
interest under § 40110(a) (2) because that section does not re-
quire the FAA actually own the property it disposes of, but
merely that it possess an interest in such property. 215
C. A WITHDRAWAL OF SLOTS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A TAKING
If slots are indeed property, then can the FAA confiscate them
without compensating the carriers? In short, does the FAA's
auction plan constitute a Fifth Amendment taking? Even
though, as we have seen, slots are a form of intangible property,
the FAA's withdrawal of a small portion of the slots currently
held by incumbent carriers is not a taking under the Fifth
Amendment. 216 Citing the Takings Clause, the ATA and the air-
lines argue that the portion of the FAA's plan that requires in-
cumbent carriers to relinquish slots for the auction is in effect a
"taking" of the airlines' property without the required just com-
pensation.217 Because, according to the ATA, the slot confisca-
tion plan serves no public use, the ATA concludes that the Fifth
Amendment bars the FAA from withdrawing slots from the in-
cumbent carriers.218 It is true that an impermissible "taking" oc-
curs "where government requires an owner to suffer a
212 See § 40103.
213 Id.; see also the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,549 (FAA discussing its
theory that it has a property interest in the slots).
214 See, e.g., supra note 174 and accompanying text.
215 49 U.S.C. § 40110(a)(2) (2000) (authorizing the FAA to "dispose of an in-
terest in property for adequate compensation.").
216 See, e.g., ATA's Comments Concerning LGA, supra note 126, at 18-19 (argu-
ing that the FAA's plan to confiscate a limited number of slots constitutes a
taking).
217 Id.




permanent physical invasion" of property, where government
regulations "completely deprive an owner of 'all economically
beneficial use' of her property," or where the factors in Penn
Central Transportation Company v. New York City2 9 are met. 220
The carriers, however, confuse (or perhaps purposefully ob-
scure) a property interest taken by the government through reg-
ulatory action with a property interest that naturally expires by its
own terms.
An airline's interest in slots, after all, is but a "limited interest
encumbered by conditions that the FAA impose [s] in its regula-
tions. '22 1 Thus, slots are encumbered by terms that subject
them to revocation or withdrawal by the FAA in certain circum-
stances. For example, because an FAA order conferring slots is
always effective only until the FAA issues a new order that super-
sedes the old one, carriers' property interests in their slots ex-
pire when the order granting those slots expires. 222 The FAA
also grants slots subject to the use-or-lose rule, in which case a
carrier's underutilization of a slot will cause its forfeiture.223
Moreover, courts have affirmed the FAA's right to withdraw slots
generally. In Northwest Airlines, the carrier protested the FAA's
plan to withdraw slots from incumbent carriers and reallocate
them to a new entrant carrier.224 Over Northwest's objection,
the court held that the FAA possessed the authority to reclaim
and redistribute existing slots. 225 Similarly, the FAA's 1986 plan
to employ a reverse lottery to withdraw slots from the incumbent
carriers was unchallenged.2 26
219 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
220 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (internal citations
omitted). Penn Central does not establish a "set formula" for determining
whether a regulatory taking has occurred, but instead articulates several factors,
such as the regulation's economic impact and the degree to which the property
owner's rights are infringed. Id. at 538-39.
221 In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1989).
222 Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport, supra note 12, at
77,860 ("When the final Order expires, any [slots held by carriers at LGA] will
revert to the FAA for reallocation .... ").
223 See supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting that slots are revocable
when a carrier violates the "use-or-lose" rule).
224 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1311-13 (8th Cir.
1981); see also supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
225 Northwest Airlines, 645 F.2d at 1315. In Northwest Airlines, whether the FAA's
withdrawal of slots constituted a taking was not apparently raised by Northwest;
however, the case's holding demonstrates the FAA's broad authority to withdraw
slots.
226 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, when the FAA issued its previous slot capping and
allocation orders for carriers serving the New York airports,
those carriers that received slot authorizations took their inter-
ests subject to losing them.227 This is precisely why the court in
Gull Air ultimately found that the airline's slots, though prop-
erty, were nonetheless not part of the bankruptcy estate. Since
Gull Air's slots expired, by their terms, after a period of non-use,
the carrier's property interest in those slots also expired, and
the slots reverted to the FAA.228 Thus, in the instant matter, the
FAA's withdrawal of a portion of the incumbent carriers' slots
cannot constitute a taking. The slot withdrawal neither repre-
sents a permanent invasion of the owner's property nor deprives
the owner of all economically beneficial use. Carriers that enter
into slot authorization agreements with the FAA have always
done so at the risk that they will lose those authorizations either
at the expiration of the authorization, if they violate the authori-
zation's terms or conditions, or sooner if the FAA issues a super-
seding order.229 If a carrier's interest in a slot is withdrawn by
the FAA under these scenarios, then that withdrawal cannot be a
Fifth Amendment taking. When property reverts according to
the express provisions of the instrument conveying the interest,
that reversion is no more a taking than "there would be in the
eleventh year of a ten year lease." 230
V. CONCLUSION
The FAA's slot auction plan is a rational, market-based
method of fairly allocating a scarce resource. The plan skillfully
combines the right amount of market-based principles and com-
petition-promoting methods to effectively, if only temporarily,
control the airspace congestion exigency facing New York.
Given the reality of today's air travel system-and the over-
crowding of New York airspace specifically-government action
is necessary to provide safe and efficient air access to New York.
227 See, e.g., the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,580-81; see also In re Gull Air, Inc.,
890 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (1st Cir. 1989) (recognizing that although a slot confers
a property interest to the airline, such interest can expire by its own terms).
228 Gull Air, 890 F.2d at 1260-61.
229 See the JFK/EWR Plan, supra note 1, at 60,551; see also the LGA Plan, supra
note 9, at 60,580-81. Note that the FAA has historically not been so heavy-
handed as to forcibly take slot authorizations from carriers that hold them. As
one carrier noted, it has held its New York slots "more or less continuously" for
40 years. Id. (citing the comments of US Airways).
230 See the LGA Plan, supra note 9, at 60,581.
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A well-conceived congestion management plan fits the bill.
Congestion management, however, should not come at the ex-
pense of competition, nor should it induce prohibitively high
airfares. The FAA has shown care and great diligence in ensur-
ing that such undesirables do not come to bear. The auction
plan, while an admittedly novel use of its authority, is neverthe-
less legal under the current provisions of the FAA's property
management power. The fact that airlines hope to avoid paying
for what was previously allocated to them for free is understand-
able, particularly in today's frosty economic climate. However,
the public's interest in safe, reliable travel to and from New
York, in a manner that does not create artificially high airfares
or an anticompetitive landscape, must prevail. If the courts find
that the FAA lacks the authority to implement its slot-auction
scheme, then Congress should begin work immediately to be-
stow express authority upon the FAA to conduct the auctions.
The FAA and the DOT should, in turn, continue airspace infras-
tructural improvements that will, in time, increase air traffic ca-
pacity in the New York area and reduce or eliminate the need
for controversial slot capping and allocation. In the absence of
a sensible fix to the current congestion crisis plaguing the air-
space, however, the problem is a brimming cauldron which will
soon enough reach another boiling point-as it did in the sum-
mer of 2007-and the travel-weary public will again suffer the
stinging brunt of the consequences.
2009]
SLAs. It*
